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‘Zippin’ up My Boots, Goin’ Back to
My Roots’: Radical Left Parties in
Southern Europe
Myrto Tsakatika and Marco Lisi
Radical left parties actively encourage the participation of their members in internal
decision-making and insist on promoting organised links to trade unions and social
movements. As a party family, they deviate from what is considered to be the trend in
which Western political parties have turned their backs on their social roots. Drawing on
the experience of South European radical left parties from the fall of the Berlin Wall until
the recent financial crisis, we argue that ideology, electoral incentives, party competition
and external events explain the radical left’s pronounced emphasis on linkage, while
organisational trajectory explains variation within the party family in terms of the linkage
strategies pursued.
Keywords: Radical Left Parties; Southern Europe; Participatory Linkage; Environmental
Linkage; Linkage Strategies; Party Change
According to Katz and Mair’s (1995) influential ‘cartel party’ thesis, political parties
are increasingly orienting their actions towards occupying the state while disengaging
from their social roots. It is said that there is no longer a strong incentive for parties to
encourage members to take an active role, since the functions they once performed
such as party funding and labour-intensive campaigning are now being replaced by
state funding and mass media campaigns, respectively. It is likewise argued that parties
are confronted with incentives to distance themselves from organisations of civil
society, because their appeal is increasingly directed beyond their particular social
constituency. Strong and exclusive party links to a small, well-defined range of interest
groups carry the risk of alienating other civil society organisations and place excessive
constraints on the range of policies that parties can pursue (Kirchheimer 1966).
Declining membership figures (Van Biezen, Mair & Poguntke 2011) and an overall
trend of loosening and pluralisation of party–civil-society ties (Allern & Bale 2012a)
are thought to confirm these arguments.
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A number of scholars have challenged or qualified the mainstream view that parties
are turning their backs on their social roots (Yishai 2001; Caul Kittilson & Scarrow
2003; Allern & Bale 2012b). They have argued that political parties continue to pursue
linkage because their electoral stability (Poguntke 2002; Scarrow 2009), legitimacy
(Warner 2000, p. 164; Allern 2010) and even—to a certain extent—funding (Pedersen
et al. 2004), continue to depend on it. Their research has shown that parties have
tended to encourage the active involvement of members (and in some cases
sympathisers) by strengthening their rights in candidate and leadership selection
(Caul Kittilson & Scarrow 2003; Hazan & Rahat 2010; Cross & Blais 2012) and party
policy-making (Gauja 2009). It has also demonstrated that parties have maintained
formal ties (Aarts 1995; Poguntke 2002) and, most importantly, enhanced their
informal interactions with civil society groups through joint committee meetings,
common campaigns and invitations to civil society organisations, whose purpose is to
engage them in drawing up party manifestos and key decision-making (Thomas 2001;
Poguntke 2006; Allern 2010). It has also been found that parties try to establish new
links to social organisations that emerge as a result of social change (Yishai 2001), to
create new ancillary structures, such as youth and women’s organisations (Poguntke
2002) and to take the initiative to build new external civic organisations (Kitschelt
2006; Verge 2012) in order to target new supporters.
This special issue aims to add to the above voices by examining the linkage strategies
of the European radical left party family. Radical left parties have recovered from the
collapse of communism (March 2011, p. 1). They have not only remained politically
and electorally relevant in European party systems, but also been essential partners in
government coalitions (Bale & Dunphy 2011). Contrary to what might be expected on
the basis of Katz and Mair’s thesis and despite an increasingly common office-seeking
orientation, not only have the parties of the European radical left remained committed
to their social roots, but there are valid indications that they have prioritised linkage
and introduced significant organisational innovations in order to pursue the
strengthening of ties to their social roots more effectively. Comparative study of radical
left parties’ distinctive efforts to pursue linkage, as advanced in this special issue,
allows us to explore the factors that make it more likely for political parties to
prioritise linkage, and consequently to revisit an important aspect of the
contemporary theory of party change. We also aim to make a significant contribution
to the emerging new research agenda on radical left parties, particularly to the study
of their organisational development, social linkages and mobilisation strategy
(Bosco 2000; March & Mudde 2005; Della Porta 2007; March 2011; De Waele &
Seiler 2012).
The article proceeds as follows. In the next section we present the broad parameters
of the research design adopted by the works in this special issue. Drawing on data from
the case studies examined in this volume, the third section identifies the instances in
which South European radical left parties have launched linkage strategies over the last
two decades and sets out to explain why they did so. The fourth section discusses the
main findings in terms of how the parties examined have pursued linkage and what
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kinds of organisational innovations they have introduced to that effect, focusing on
the differences between them. The fifth section examines the relationship between the
radical left and civil society during the economic crisis. A final section concludes with
a summary and suggestions for further research.
Linkage in a Crisis Zone
This special issue brings forth original data on the efforts made to strengthen linkages
to their social roots since the fall of the Berlin Wall by all relevant radical left parties in
Portugal—Partido Comunista Portugueˆs (Portuguese Communist Party, PCP) and
Bloco de Esquerda (Left Bloc, BE), Spain—Izquierda Unida (United Left, IU), Italy—
Federazione della Sinistra (Left Federation, FDS) and Sinistra Ecologia e Liberta` (Left
Ecology and Freedom, SEL), Greece—Kommoynistiko´ Ko´mma Ella´da6 (Commu-
nist Party of Greece, KKE) and Synaspismo´6 th6 Arist1ra´6 th6 Oikologi´a6 kai
tvn Koinvnikv´n Kinhma´tvn (Coalition of the Left, Ecology and Social Movements,
SYN)/Synaspismo´6 Pizospastikh´6 Arist1ra´6 (Coalition of the Radical Left,
SYRIZA)1 and the Republic of Cyprus—Anoruvtiko´ Ko´mma Ergazom1´noy Laoy´
(Progressive Party of the Working People, AKEL). Given that the FDS and SEL are very
recent formations that have yet to compete in national elections, in this article we
complement our analysis of the Italian case with data from secondary sources
regarding the linkages to civil society of the Partito della Rifondazione Comunista
(Communist Refoundation Party, PRC) and the Partito dei Comunisti Italiani (Party
of Italian Communists, PdCI), both relevant parties of the radical left throughout
most of the 1990s and 2000s.
The studies in this special issue focus on ‘participatory’ linkage, namely relations
between the party leadership and party members (as well as sympathisers in some
cases), and ‘environmental’ linkage, i.e. relations between the party and organised
groups in civil society. Kay Lawson conceptualised political parties as agencies that
forge links between citizens and policy-makers, introducing the notion of
‘participatory’ linkage (Lawson 1980). Parties use participatory linkages to mobilise
and involve their members in the political process by channelling the expression and
representation of their preferences. Building on Lawson’s work, Schwartz looks at
parties as ‘multi-unit’ organisations that are simultaneously engaged in building and
maintaining relations among the party subunits and between the party and its external
environment (Schwartz 2005). While Lawson’s ‘participatory linkage’ can be
conceptualised as one of the most important forms of relations between the party’s
subunits, what Schwartz calls ‘environmental linkage’ concerns the relation between
the party and groups active in its social environment. Parties, she notes, ‘normally seek
to mobilise supporters in terms of demographic or other characteristics, not as
indistinguishable voters’ (Schwartz 2005, pp. 38–39). Environmental linkage
buttresses one of the essential functions played by political parties, that is, articulating
and aggregating interest. It is our understanding that parties’ ties to their social roots
are to a large extent captured by these two types of linkage.
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Radical left parties in Southern Europe have been selected because they constitute a
well-represented and—from a linkage point of view—sufficiently representative
sample of this party family in the European context. Radical left parties on the
whole remain electorally relevant in Southern Europe (Table 1), which continues to
be one of the main areas of European anti-capitalism (March 2011; De Waele &
Seiler 2012).
In terms of pre-existing linkages, some of these parties are among the oldest and
most established in their respective party systems (AKEL, KKE, PCP) with deep social
roots and entrenched practices of democratic centralism. Others have emerged more
recently as a consequence of the change that several communist parties have
Table 1 National Election Results of Radical Left Parties in Southern Europe (1989–2012, %)
Cyprus Greece Italy Portugal Spain
AKEL KKE SYN PRC PdCI PCP BE IU
1989 13.1 9.1
1989 11.0
1990 10.3
1991 30.6 8.8
1992 5.6
1993 4.5 2.9 9.5
1994 6.1
1995 8.6
1996 33.0 5.6 5.1 8.6 10.5
1999 9.0 2.4
2000 5.5 3.2 5.4
2001 34.7 5.0 1.7
2002 6.9 2.7
2004 5.9 3.3 4.9
2005 7.5 6.3
2006 31.1 5.8 2.3
2007 8.2 5.0
2008 3.1 3.8
2009 7.5 4.6 7.9 9.8
2011 32.7 7.9 5.2 6.9
2012 8.5 16.8
2012 4.5 26.7
Average 32.4 7.7 8.5 5.7 2.0 8.1 5.3 7.2
Total radical left 32.4 13.8 6.4 11.9 7.2
Sources: Cyprus: www.parties-and-elections.de; Greece: Greek Ministry of the Interior; Italy:
www.parties-and-elections.de; Portugal: Comissa˜o Nacional de Eleic¸o˜es (National Electoral
Commission); Spain: Spanish Ministry of Interior and www.historiaelectoral.com.
Notes: The average for the total left in Greece does not include the vote obtained by Dhmokratikh´
Aristera´ (Democratic Left, DL) in the 2012 election. For the 2008 Italian election we consider the
vote for the coalition Sinistra Arcobaleno (Rainbow Left, SA). The FDS and SEL will compete for the
first time in the 2013 Italian national election.
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experienced over the last two decades. This is the case of ‘renewer’ communist parties
in Italy, Spain and Greece (PRC, IU, SYN) which implemented significant ideological
and organisational transformations after (or just before) the fall of the Berlin Wall.2
Finally, BE and SEL constitute very recent formations with scant organisational roots
and strong reliance on ‘new politics’ issues and the new social media for their
interaction with civil society.
The timeframe adopted spans two decades and is delimited by two major events: the
fall of the Berlin Wall and the advent of the 2008–12 global economic crisis. Linkage
strategies are arduous enterprises whose study requires that we take a long-term view
in order to trace their evolution. As seen in the chapters in this special issue, the
linkage strategies that parties pursue are usually explicitly launched at a certain point
in time—most often in the context of a party conference—as public statements of
parties’ willingness to reconnect to their grassroots. These statements go hand in hand
with the introduction of organisational reforms that parties undertake in order to be
able to pursue linkage more effectively. Two decades are a sufficient period of time over
which the development of such strategies can be observed.
As to the events that frame the specific time period selected, the fall of the Berlin
Wall was a crucial turning point for the parties of the radical left, which—along with
their strategy, programmatic offer and organisation—is likely to have rendered them
prone to reconsidering their links to grassroots (March 2011). The current economic
crisis seems to be marking another crucial turning point in the radical left parties’
approach to linkage, given the extent of social mobilisation that the harsh austerity
policies have generated. Nowhere are these latest developments more pronounced
than in Southern Europe. However, making sense of radical left parties’ attempts to
enhance linkage to individuals and groups over the last few years, when the economic
crisis hit the region, will only be possible against the background of the linkage
strategies that radical left parties have developed over the past two decades.
The Importance of Social Roots: Why Radical Left Parties Launch Linkage
Strategies
The country case studies in this special issue demonstrate that all South European
radical left parties have initiated linkage strategies over the period studied (Table 2).
Linkage strategies have been launched in the context of a founding party congress
(PRC in 1991, PdCI in 1998, BE in 1999, FDS and SEL in 2008, SYRIZA in 2012), a re-
founding congress (AKEL 1993, IU 2010) or a congress that embeds a party in the
context of a stable political coalition with other usually much smaller parties, groups,
movements and individuals of the radical left (IU in 1987, SYRIZA in 2001). In other
cases linkage strategies have been initiated in the context of a party joining a broader
social platform such as the Social Forum (PCP in 2003) or founding a new ancillary
organisation (KKE in 1999). At this point, the objection might be made that it is very
difficult to establish exactly when a party decides to initiate a new attempt to pursue
linkage. It is indeed very likely that the decision has been taken in advance and is only
South European Society and Politics 5
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publicly announced in a congress or expressed in a particular party initiative.
Nonetheless, we will take these key events as relatively reliable approximations. They
are significant political events that radical left parties deliberately use in order to signal
that they have decided to ‘return to grassroots’.
With regard to the question of why radical left parties in Southern Europe launch
linkage strategies, four patterns become apparent from the comparative analysis of the
case studies in this special issue. These patterns point to specific factors that are likely
to be decisive.
The first pattern that emerges from our case studies is that all the radical left parties
examined have enhanced their efforts to reach out to their social roots over the past
two decades. This implies that linkage is important to the party family as a whole by
virtue of its ideology. In historical terms, communist parties pursued the tight
encapsulation of members and the development of strong and wide organisational ties
to specific segments of civil society in order to form ‘counter-societies’ (Kriegel 1972).
The pursuit of strong links to their grassroots was closely related to their need to rely
on extra-institutional mobilisation, given their exclusion from and their suspicion of
the state apparatus. It was equally related to their ideology and organisational
philosophy, according to which the very aim of the party was to unite and direct the
class struggle of the proletariat (Lenin [1902] 1963). All radical left parties have
inherited this legacy which emphasises the importance of social roots not only in their
discourse but also as a central element of their internal functioning.
This ideological appeal has been an important asset for radical left parties in order
to mobilise and encapsulate specific groups through their organisations. In other
words, despite their increasingly office-seeking orientation, radical left parties remain
parties for which ideological consistency is of paramount importance (Charalambous,
in press) and whose appeal continues to make reference to championing the interests
and values of a particular social constituency (Allern 2010, p. 295). As Lipset and
Table 2 Linkage Strategies Launched by South European Radical Left Parties (1987–2012)
Leninist parties ‘Renewer’ parties New
parties
AKEL KKE PCP PdCI SYN/SYRIZA PRC FDS IU BE SEL
1987 x x
1989
1991 x
1993 x
1998 x
1999 x x x x x
2001 x
2003 x
2008 x x
2010 x
2011 x x
2012 x x x
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Rokkan have shown (1967, pp. 1 – 64), strengthening the ideological and
organisational bonds between radical left parties and ‘their’ social constituency
enhances party legitimacy by reinforcing partisan alignments and members’
identification. Pursuing linkage to citizens and organised groups that share the
party’s goals, values and ideas is thus a stable, long-term priority for radical left parties
as a party family insofar as ideological consistency and constituency representation
remain central to their legitimacy. Despite the claim made by scholars that by the late
1980s radical left parties had distanced themselves from civil society (Lazar 1988), the
articles in this special issue demonstrate that they continue to attempt to maintain
proximity to their social roots and to build their appeal on specific ‘natural
collectivities’.
The second pattern that can be discerned can be associated with the fact that a
certain class of external events seems to play some part in ‘triggering’ radical left
parties’ prioritisation of linkage. Most of the instances we have identified when radical
left parties have initiated linkage strategies took place in the late 1990s after the rise of
the ‘global justice movement’ (GJM) (SYN, KKE, BE, PCP, PRC) and/or very recently,
after the sovereign debt crisis in 2010–11 (SYRIZA, KKE, IU, BE, PCP). The rise of the
GJM was the first international event that brought the left’s agenda to the fore in a
decade, with at least some radical left parties attempting to update and reconsider that
agenda from a global point of view (Della Porta 2007). The economic crisis has
brought the critique of the policies of austerity to the fore and is forcing the radical left
to put forth its own anti-neoliberal agenda. In both cases, the high levels of social
protest that ensued rendered the pursuit of linkage to the mobilised sectors a challenge
and an opportunity for the South European radical left. This should not come as a
surprise to party scholars: parties may be conservative organisations but they are able
to adapt to transformations in their external environment by introducing
organisational change (Harmel & Janda 1994; Panebianco 1988). Such change may
include innovation in the way parties organise linkage to their social roots. Clearly, the
events that affect radical left parties’ linkage strategy are the ones that resonate with
key features of their ideology. Their continued emphasis on policy-seeking and
ideology means that radical left parties’ legitimacy is affected by external events that
question, confirm or highlight their core principles and agenda. When radical left
parties’ legitimacy is in question as a result of such events, they seem to re-emphasise
their links to their grassroots.
A third significant pattern can be associated with parties’ responses to electoral
incentives in the national political arena. Some cases in our sample can be explained in
terms of party responses to electoral downturns. In particular, in the case of the PCP
and IU in the late 1980s, as well as SYN and the KKE in the late 1990s, the parties of the
radical left reacted to poor electoral performance by introducing new forms of linkage
and relying on new forms of extra-parliamentary mobilisation. Parties’ capacity to
control their environment and stabilise influence over their ‘social turf ’ continues to
be a key to their survival (Panebianco 1988). Even if in the short term radical left
parties do not necessarily expect a renewed emphasis on linkage to result in an
South European Society and Politics 7
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immediate trade-off in votes (Allern 2010), they can be expected to signal their
prioritisation of linkage after a particularly significant loss of votes. This may be
thought of not so much as a knee-jerk reaction and more as a first step in a long-term
strategy whereby deepening bonds with the party grassroots will help translate
symbolic change into electoral gains.
A fourth and final pattern that can shed light on the question of why radical left
parties launch linkage strategies is discernible in their responses to changes in national
party competition. In Portugal, the PCP attempted to differentiate its ties to civil
society, particularly in terms of revisiting its environmental linkage strategy, in order
to prevent the further electoral advance of BE at its own expense at the turn of the
twenty-first century. In much the same way, the Cypriot AKEL had modified its
participatory linkages in the early 1990s in order to prevent membership defection and
the electoral rise of a ‘renewer’ competitor, the Ananevtiko´ Dhmokratiko´
Sosialistiko´ Ki´nhma (Renewalist Democratic Socialist Movement, ADISOK).
Moreover, newer radical left parties with weak social roots can be expected to be more
vulnerable to the lack of organisational resources than established ones (Kitschelt
2006). The struggle for the mobilisation of new sectors and the attempt to appeal to
groups with previous loyalties will lead newer parties to adopt a more aggressive,
competitive strategy. This was the case with the emergence of the BE in 1999, as well as
with SEL and FDS in 2008. In contrast to new parties, established radical left parties
with traditional ties to a particular constituency and particular groups may take those
links for granted, neglecting the pursuit of linkage.
The tendency to strengthen linkage when adopting or returning to an oppositional
role is also related to the radical left parties’ competitive strategy. In some of the cases
studied in this volume, it seems that when radical left parties pursue office they tend to
de-emphasise linkage, or at least not stress it to the same extent as when they follow an
oppositional strategy. This pattern is discernible in the trajectories of both parties of
the Greek left: SYN and the KKE neglected linkage over most of the 1990s, when they
prioritised office-seeking, but they re-emphasised linkage when their strategy became
oppositional and protest oriented. In a similar vein, the PRC prioritised linkage with
social movements while taking an oppositional role, but was less able to pursue these
links consistently when the party decided to participate in the centre-left coalition
government headed by Romano Prodi in 2006. This pattern is also detectable in party
attitudes towards linkage over the current economic crisis. The case studies in this
special issue reveal a distinction between AKEL (a party in charge of a government
forced to implement severe austerity measures) and SEL (which seeks participation in
a future centre-left coalition), on the one hand, and the radical left parties that are in
opposition, on the other one. While the latter have all reinvigorated their linkage
strategies and actively tried to link to the new actors that have arisen out of Southern
Europe’s new politics of protest, the former have found themselves in fairly awkward
positions with regard to linkage (see the section on the financial crisis below).
To summarise, all radical left parties in Southern Europe have engaged at least once
in launching linkage strategies over the last two decades. In some cases this can be
8 M. Tsakatika and M. Lisi
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attributed to responses to external events, electoral incentives or changes in the
dynamics of party competition. In all cases, as we argued, it is first and foremost their
ideological legacy which dictates their constant concern with linkage. It is part and
parcel of their ideology that they must be seen to represent the interests, ideas and
values of a particular constituency. Failing to do so would damage their legitimacy.
Participatory and Environmental Linkages of the South European Radical Left
As shown in the previous section, all of the parties studied in the chapters of this
volume have launched explicit linkage strategies over the past two decades. In all
cases—with the exception of the PCP—this has been marked by the introduction of
organisational innovations that would enable them to pursue participatory and/or
environmental linkage more effectively (Table 3). This section demonstrates that there
are persistent differences among radical left parties in Southern Europe with regard to
the way they pursue linkage, mirrored in distinct types of organisational innovation.
Divergence, it will be argued, can be explained in terms of party legacy and
organisational trajectory (Allern 2010; Verge 2012).
With regard to participatory linkage, AKEL, the KKE and the PCP continue to
operate on the principle that the party leadership should remain all powerful vis-a`-vis
party members, while implementing—to varying degrees—internal change aimed at
retaining the encapsulation of members and building or maintaining a compact and
self-contained subculture. Similarly, the PdCI, founded in 1998 as a minority
‘orthodox’ split from the ‘movementist’ PRC, reproduced the traditional mass party
structure based on democratic centralism (Bordandini & Di Virgilio 2007). Since the
late 1990s, the KKE has undergone a profound ‘re-bolshevisation’ in terms of its
reinstatement of the organisational principles of democratic centralism (Tsakatika &
Eleftheriou, this volume). AKEL experienced a limited internal reorganisation in the
early 1990s which allowed its members greater participation rights, while maintaining
a veto for key decisions at the higher echelons of the party. The aim was to strengthen
the new leadership both within and outside the party, increasing its legitimacy through
the implementation of more democratic rules (Charalambous & Christophorou, this
volume). The PCP, on the other hand, has not introduced any significant changes in
the way it exercises participatory linkage over the democratic period and has thus
continued to abide by the principles of democratic centralism, despite an alarming
number of dissidents leaving the party (Jalali & Lisi 2012).
IU, BE, SYN/SYRIZA and PRC (as well as FDS and SEL) have implemented
significant innovations in the way they organise the participation of their members
and in the decision-making rights they allocate to members and supporters. Their aim
has been to stimulate bottom-up participation of members and achieve greater
involvement of supporters. This was particularly evident in the case of PRC, which
broke with the mass party tradition based on the active role of party members and
favoured the participation of sympathisers and less committed militants. The new
organisational structure not only accepted internal dissent and distinct political
South European Society and Politics 9
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traditions, but also aimed to build a network with social groups through forms of
participatory democracy—for instance, in the elaboration of party manifestos (De
Nardis 2005). This development can also be seen in IU’s statutory provision for
candidate selection primaries and its thematic a´reas aimed at opening up party policy-
making to all members, non-members and social movements (described by Ramiro
and Verge, this volume), both foundational principles of IU from the late 1980s.
Likewise, SYN members’ referenda to establish the order of candidates for the
European Parliament (EP) on the party lists, an innovation introduced in 1992
(Tsakatika 2010), and the BE’s application since 1999 of principles of ‘polyarchic’
leadership, MPs’ rotation and intra-party democracy serve the same purpose. The
openness of both FDS and SEL in terms of policy-making input, i.e. through the local
‘Houses of the Left’,5 thematic fora and referenda as well as the SEL leader’s online
support circles (Fabbriche di Nichi), is a more recent expression of the same
imperative of empowering party members. In practice, SEL seems to be more effective
in implementing the new forms of participatory linkage than FDS, although the
impetus towards greater openness has diminished during the Monti government (see
below). New modes of mobilisation have also been adopted as part of broadening
individual members’ repertoire of participation beyond traditional party structures,
involving practices such as ‘mail-bombing’ and ‘flash mobs’ (Bordandini, this
volume). Furthermore, some of these parties have been actively encouraging the
politicisation of their younger cohorts through novel channels, for instance by
supporting their involvement in new social movements and solidarity initiatives, as
shown by SYN Youth in Greece and the BE in Portugal. For all six parties, empowering
members in party decision-making has been a genuine aim but in practice it has often
encountered obstacles due to the overwhelming strength of factions (SYN, IU, BE,
PRC, FDS) or the leadership (BE, SEL).
Moving on to environmental linkage, AKEL, the PCP, the KKE and the PdCI have
aimed to guide civil society organisations from the top down through their ancillary
organisations, to which they lay exclusive claim; they follow the traditional
‘transmission belt’ model associated with parties based on the Leninist model, which
sees the party as a political and intellectual vanguard meant to educate the masses
(Table 4). Their primary focus is on trade unions, where the party by and large directs
the political aims and the mobilisation strategy of its ancillary organisations. AKEL,
the KKE and the PCP are all highly successful in maintaining formal or quasi-formal,
stable and enduring ties to the Pagky´pria Ergatikh´ Omospondi´a (Pan-Cyprian
Labour Federation, PEO), the Pan1rgatiko´ Agvnistiko´ M1´tvpo (All Workers
Militant Front, PAME) and the Confederac¸a˜o Geral dos Trabalhadores Portugueses
(General Confederation of Portuguese Workers, CGTP), respectively. The PdCI had
also sought to establish strong organisational ties to the largest Italian trade union, the
Confederazione Generale Italiana del Lavoro (Italian General Confederation of
Labour, CGIL), with limited success.
AKEL is singular in this respect among current European radical left parties, as it
not only dominates the trade union movement but also maintains an extraordinary
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network of other ancillary organisations within civil society organisations that reach
every nook and cranny of Cypriot society, including youth and women’s associations,
cultural and athletic activities, farmers’ organisations and the business sector. It has
also reached out to sectors of civil society, such as environmental NGOs, which are to
be found outside the range of its own ancillary structures. Over the last decade the
KKE has restructured its entire party organisation in order to accommodate the needs
of its ancillary trade union, PAME, while remaining extremely critical of social
movements, such as the GJM, over which it has no influence. As shown by Lisi (this
volume), the PCP has also prioritised its links to the main trade union. It did take
small and reluctant steps towards approaching the new social movements in the early
2000s, but only when it became clear that its failure to engage with them would benefit
its main competitor. The election in 2012 of a former member of the PCP’s Central
Committee as the new secretary-general of the CGTP confirmed the continued
influence of the party over the trade union movement. All three parties generally
favour more traditional modes of mobilisation, such as strikes and mass
demonstrations, and tend to distrust or to rely little on social movements or activist
practices.
The pioneering experience of the PRC was of the utmost importance for the
evolution of environmental linkage between South European radical left parties and
the new social movements. In this respect, the PRC model influenced all the parties
examined in this special issue, with the exception of the KKE, the PCP and AKEL. In
accordance with the organisational transformation and ideological renewal
implemented after the IV Congress (1999), the PRC aimed to break with the
democratic centralist tradition, establishing organic, strong, less exclusive and more
mutual ties to social movements and independent trade unions (comitati di base),
‘internalising’ the movement experience and reinvigorating its political action and
mobilisation practices (De Nardis 2005; Bordandini & Di Virgilio 2007).
Drawing on the PRC model, environmental linkage between SYN, IU, BE, FDS, SEL
and the new social movements has since mostly taken place informally through loose
leadership and membership overlap and in the case of SYN/SYRIZA through the
establishment of a connective role for social solidarity initiatives or by providing a
bridge that links the movements together. These ties are also used to further parties’
aims of recruiting cadres and integrating members: they may be seen as a ‘functional
equivalent’ or substitute for the mass party subculture. Radical left parties’ links to
social movements may be mostly informal but, contrary to what some scholars assume
(Poguntke 2002), they are not necessarily weak. They are often enduring despite
variation in levels of social movement mobilisation over time. BE, SYN, IU, FDS and
SEL (as well as the PRC before them) adopt, articulate and champion the ‘new politics’
claims of these movements in the political arena. They gain in terms of legitimacy by
presenting themselves to the electorate as the social movements’ privileged and reliable
allies.
More formal interactions between these parties and the social movements have also
been advanced through the coalition strategy (IU, SYRIZA) and participation in social
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platforms alongside other organisations of civil society such as (but not exclusively)
the national social fora (BE, SYN, IU and PRC in the past). This change was related to
a shift in mobilisation strategy, aiming to broaden participation to non-members
(‘independents’) and to institutionalise cooptation of friendly civic organisations.
With the exception of SEL, which according to its delegates does not look for close
or exclusive ties to particular trade unions (despite promoting the unity of the trade
union movement in Italy), all the parties examined pursue preferential links with trade
unions, alongside their commitment to develop and maintain links to new social
movements. While SYN has gone down the route of setting up its own rudimentary
collateral organisation in the labour movement and the FDS has built privileged links
to the CGIL, the IU and BE have preferred to rely more on membership and cadre
overlap in the unions closest to them, the now fully independent Comissiones Obreras
(Workers’ Commissions, CCOO) in Spain and the PCP-dominated CGTP in Portugal,
respectively. However, newer parties such as BE have experienced considerable
difficulty in developing links to established labour organisations. BE, SYN and SEL (as
well as the PRC before them) are open to direct collaboration with base-level labour
committees that are not necessarily part of the official trade union confederations.
With regard to the direction (Duverger [1951] 1964), strength and exclusivity of
linkage (Allern 2010), our findings show that there is considerable variation in the way
party linkages are pursued within the radical left party family (Table 4). On the one
hand, parties adhering to the Leninist tradition—such as AKEL, the KKE, the PCP and
the PdCI—have established top-down linkages with their members and civil society
organisations, with strong and exclusive ties. On the other hand, ‘renewer’ and newer
parties have preferred mutual, looser and less exclusive links with organised groups.
They have promoted ‘new politics’ issues and the bottom-up participation of their
members and supporters. Although they have attempted to build strong ties with civil
society and have often introduced marked organisational innovations, in practice the
informal character of this relationship has led to weaker and less stable links than those
developed by democratic centralist parties. Overall, these results confirm the
importance of the organisational trajectory on the type of linkages pursued by radical
left parties.
Linkage in the Financial Crisis: The Radical Left Divided?
The adverse social effects of the recent economic crisis have triggered high levels of
civil society mobilisation against the South European governing parties, constrained
to apply painful austerity measures and structural reforms. The factors that were
identified in the previous sections as explaining why (ideology, external events,
electoral incentives and party competition) and how (history and organisational
trajectory) radical left parties pursue participatory and environmental linkage go a
long way towards explaining their responses over the crisis period.
AKEL is the only radical left party in Europe that is currently in charge of
government under crisis conditions. It finds itself constrained to implement austerity
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measures and extensive structural reforms under pressure from markets, credit rating
agencies and EU fiscal norms as much as other governments in the region. AKEL
seems to be using its linkages to civil society organisations to pacify the wave of social
protest that could potentially arise, as noted by Charalambous and Christophorou
(this volume).
The Italian case highlights the fact that, in addition to government incumbency, an
office-seeking strategy may also limit the mobilisation potential of the radical left.
While FDS has displayed a strong opposition to the Monti government, contesting not
only the austerity measures but also labour and pension reforms, liberalisation policies
and the dismantlement of the public sector, SEL has adopted a more moderate
position given a prospective alliance with the main centre-left party, Partito
Democratico (Democratic Party, PD). Despite its (inevitable) reliance on extra-
parliamentary mobilisation, SEL has agreed to sign an agreement with the PD for the
next general elections (scheduled for spring 2013). This has caused some
disgruntlement within the party, which demonstrates the difficulties involved in
combining office- and policy-seeking objectives.
Radical left parties in Greece, Spain and Portugal have put up strong opposition to
government measures and have taken to the streets alongside trade unions and social
movements. IU is supportive of strike action organised by the main trade unions, but
seems to be having trouble connecting to the social movements that have emerged in
response to the crisis. Despite the fact that there was a higher proportion of IU
members among participants in the Indignados (Indignants) movement3 than of
members of other parties (Martı´n 2012), the anti-party character of the movement
and the wait-and-see strategy adopted by the IU leadership have been obstacles to the
IU assuming a leading role in the mobilisation of civil society, even in times of crisis.4
The BE and SYN/SYRIZA are involved in social mobilisation, supporting the new
social movements, activist practices and solidarity initiatives such as the Indignados
that have arisen in response to cuts and labour reforms, articulating their claims in the
political sphere and pursuing a mutual partnership with them. On the other hand, the
PCP and the KKE have put all their weight behind trade union protests and strikes and
tried to steer popular mobilisation through their ancillary organisations. They have
not connected to the new social movements, the KKE going as far as to reject them as
little more than a distraction from the main aims of the class struggle. While in
Portugal radical left parties are finding it difficult to connect to new social movements
because, much like in Spain, they are confronting generalised attitudes of scepticism
and anti-partyism, the Greek radical left is facing a completely different situation. The
June 2012 elections brought about an overhaul of the Greek political system and
system of interest representation, SYRIZA being the main beneficiary in terms of votes,
and individual supporters and trade unionists (from the broader centre-left) joining
its ranks en masse. Tsakatika and Eleftheriou (this volume) argue that SYRIZA’s
internal pluralism and unitary approach to environmental linkage have strengthened
its legitimacy and credibility and given it a clear advantage over its longstanding
competitor, the KKE.
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Conclusions
The studies of South European radical left parties’ linkages which populate this special
issue have not confirmed the claim that parties are turning their backs on their
members and organised groups. On the contrary, findings add to the comparative
literature that stresses the importance parties attribute to prioritising these links. From
a comparative perspective, ideology emerges as a key factor in explaining the extent to
which parties prioritise linkage. Despite profound differences within the party family,
all radical left parties pursue linkage because this is part of their ideological core and
very raison d’eˆtre. Moreover, they have pursued linkage in ways that have resonated
with their legacy, introducing changes with the aim of maintaining or reinforcing their
political identities, as well as their normative conception of democracy. This finding
indicates that Lipset and Rokkan’s (1967) cleavage-based approach may well continue
to be a relevant lens with which to assess linkage, and the comparative study of linkage
across party families a fruitful pursuit if we wish to make sense of variation. Further
research could explore, for instance, the possibility that party families such as the
Greens and the extreme right whose ideology also emphasises ties to the grassroots are
as inclined to pursue linkage as the radical left party family.
Our findings only partially confirm the general trends in the evolution of European
parties’ participatory and environmental linkages, involving, respectively, the trend
towards internal party democratisation and the trend towards the establishment of
looser and broader links between political parties and organisations of civil society.
While democratic centralist parties in Southern Europe (PCP, KKE, AKEL) deviate
from the trend of allocating greater decision-making rights to members, ‘renewer’ and
newer parties converge, as they have a strong commitment to grassroots’ participation
and intra-party democracy. In terms of environmental linkage, the Leninist parties
remain vanguardist and thus deviate from the general trend that sees the rise of more
informal and less exclusive links. Developments in SEL, FDS, BE, SYN/SYRIZA and IU
demonstrate that these parties do attempt to relate on a more mutual basis to a
multitude of groups and introduce important organisational innovations that
reinforce the role of parties as ‘receivers’ rather than ‘transmitters’ (Katz & Mair 2012).
However, ‘renewer’ and newer parties of the South European radical left still generally
prefer to maintain strong (though informal) ties to a limited number of groups,
namely those they see as more representative of, or whose interests they interpret as
being akin to, those of their social constituencies. They aim to be seen as the privileged
political ‘representatives’ of social movements and trade unions rather than simply
one of the latter’s political contacts. Further comparative research is required to
explore whether these findings can be generalised to radical left parties in other
countries in Europe and beyond.
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Notes
[1] SYRIZA is a political coalition between SYN and a number of small groups, social movements
and parties of the Greek extra-parliamentary left which was forged in 2001, remained an
electoral coalition between 2004 and 2012 and was transformed into a unified party on the eve of
the June 2012 legislative elections.
[2] With the term ‘renewer’ communist parties we emphasise the organisational changes that these
parties have undertaken since the collapse of communism. Therefore, our classification does not
follow the distinction between ‘conservative’ and ‘reform’ communist parties elaborated by March
(2011, pp. 16–19), which is based mainly on the ideological evolution of this party family.
[3] The Indignados movement, initiated by Spanish protestors in Madrid on 14 May 2011, rapidly
spread to Greece and other European countries. It demanded the reversal of austerity policies,
and direct democracy. Their protest has involved mass demonstrations and open assemblies in
central squares of large urban centres.
[4] We would like to thank Luis Ramiro and Ta`nia Verge on this point.
[5] The ‘Houses of the Left’ were local structures with the aim to gather contributions from civil
society and coordinate and mobilise different types of associations and organisations, as well as
underprivileged social groups (immigrants, young, evicted, etc.). They emerged with the birth of
the Rainbow Left and then recognised in the FDS’ statutes as a central component of its
organisation.
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